In 2011, I was assigned to head up a gang suppression team for my department. The team was formed in response to an increase in violent crimes such as homicide, shootings, assaults, and the like.

Our marching orders were simple: decrease the level of violence and get the gang problem under control. We were a “surge” of sorts, a three-man team that augmented an existing five man street crimes team. We organized our schedules to provide coverage seven days a week. My team got the not-so- highly sought after “Sunday through Wednesday” schedule. We were given pretty wide latitude regarding how to deal with the problem and the full support of our administration. Our hours were constantly changing to keep the criminals off-guard. We did a lot of work in low- profile operations in unmarked cars and civilian clothes. We intermingled with higher profile operations like the Street Crimes team, department patrol teams, and a County Gang Task Force, thus integrating unconventional with conventional assets.

The implications of the exponential flood of more than 66,127 unaccompanied children recorded by the U.S. Border Patrol by the end of August 2014¹ and counting, entering the United States over the past year from the Central American nations of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, presented the country with what President Barack Obama proclaimed in June as an "urgent humanitarian situation,"² prompting the Federal Emergency Management Agency to establish an interagency Uniformed Coordination Group that included federal, state, and local entities.³ Consequently, neither the Department of Homeland Security, municipal law enforcement, social, or educational institutions throughout the country were (or are) prepared to expeditiously and humanely manage this crisis.

The Ebola virus disease (or Ebola hemorrhagic fever) has become a horrific reality in many African states: deaths are currently running well into four figures, with health workers the worst hit. By the time this publication goes to press, it is anticipated that Ebola disasters will have been reported in Europe. It is now in mainland America.

It was Dr. James A.F. Compton, who wrote a primer on chemical and biological weapons some years ago, who made one of the most prescient comments in the modern age about biological weapons.¹ Penned at a time when the biowarfare concept was all but put on the backburner by the major Western powers—the United States included—he warned: “These weapons work!” Speaking specifically about biological arsenals, he went on to declare, “They are undergoing revolutionary developments which make them practical and very lethal participants in those human affairs which are ultimately resolved with blood and iron … be ignorant and be damned, and condemn your children as well.”

The evolution of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS, can be traced to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi shared similar experiences, ideology, strained relationships with Ayman al-Zawahiri, and a hatred of the Shia. Ibrahim ibn Awwad ibn Ibrahim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad al-Badri al-Samarrai was born in Samarra, Iraq in 1971. His family hails from the Al-Bu’ Badri clan from Samarra, Iraq, just north of Baghdad. He attended the Islamic University’s Adhamiya campus in Baghdad, earning a doctorate degree in Islamic Studies. The Adhamiya neighborhood, best known for the Abu Hanifa Mosque and the Islamic University, supported a number of militant cells during the time U.S. military forces occupied Baghdad. A number of these cells were very active targeting U.S. forces in firefights and IED attacks, and it would have been very hard for someone to attend the University and not know what was occurring or support them. What role Abu Bakr played during this period of time remains to be revealed.